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AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT: GOING, GOING...
Cheryl S. Massingale*
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of at-will employment is undergoing serious ero-
sion. At-will employment has traditionally meant that either party
in an employment relationship is free to terminate employment at
any time for any reason. 'In recent years, however, court rulings
have created many exceptions to the at-will rule, and the current
status of the doctrine offers little certainty as to whether a particu-
lar dismissal decision will result in liability for wrongful
termination.
The doctrine of at-will employment provides that where an em-
ployment contract does not specify a duration, employment is
deemed to be for an indefinite period and may be terminated at
the will of either party.1 The reason for termination is irrelevant
under the at-will doctrine. The doctrine illustrates the prevailing
principle that the parties are free to determine the terms of their
own contract. Thus, when the parties in an employment contract
have not specified a time period, neither is bound to continue the
employment arrangement once either decides to terminate it.'
The current system, which has evolved through judicially cre-
ated exceptions, is expensive, time consuming, and does not serve
either party well. In addition to the uncertainty as to what termi-
nation actions will be deemed wrongful, employers are subject to
huge damages that are disproportionate to the economic harm suf-
fered by the terminated employee. At the opposite extreme, many
wrongfully terminated employees are unable to seek legal redress
for wrongful termination due to the high cost of employment
litigation.
A new system for dealing with employee terminations is needed
which will better balance the needs of both parties in the employ-
* Assistant Professor, The University of Tennessee.
1. Note, Erosion of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Recognition of an Employee's
Right to Job Security, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 593, 593 (1986).
2. Id.
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ment relationship. The new system should require a good cause
standard for terminations and place limits on the potential liability
for employers. Arbitration in lieu of litigation would reduce trans-
action costs and make recovery more readily available to wrong-
fully terminated employees.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
In the United States, at-will employment has been recognized in
every state for most of this century.3 However, until the latter part
of the 19th century, an employment agreement that did not specify
duration was presumed to be a contract for one year. If the em-
ployment continued even one day longer than a year, the contract
was deemed to be renewed for another full year.4 This practice fol-
lowed the English rule, based on England's Statute of Labourers.5
Although the statute was repealed in 1863, the principles underly-
ing the statute continue to be followed by the English courts.' In
1877, H.G. Wood's Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant7
proposed the rule that came to be known as the employment at-
will doctrine. Wood proposed that where a servant was hired for an
indefinite period, this was prima facie hiring at-will." Wood's rule
presumed that where no employment period was specified, the par-
ties were free to terminate the employment relationship at any
time.9 Business managers welcomed this departure from the tradi-
tional rule. Changes in economic and social circumstances no
longer favored the paternalistic view that the master should take
care of servants. As America evolved into an industrialized nation,
employers needed flexibility in hiring practices and freedom to ad-
just the size of the labor force to meet changing market demands.
The principle underlying the right of the employer to terminate at-
will is, in fact, based more on freedom of enterprise than freedom
3. Id.
4. Id. at 595.
5. The original Statute of Labourers was promulgated in 1349. 23 Edw. 3, ch. 1-7 (1349).
A second Statute of Labourers was enacted in 1350. 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 1, ch. 1-7. In the 200
years which followed, the Statutes were modified and amended until 1562, when they were
replaced by the Statute of Artificers. 5 Eliz., ch. 4 (1562). Masters hired servants for one
year, and during that year the servants could be fired only for "reasonable and sufficient
cause." 5 Eliz., ch. 4, § V (1562).
6. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 425 (1969).
7. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 157 (1st ed. 1877).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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of contract.' 0 During this period employers enjoyed considerable
power, and this power ultimately led to abuses in the treatment
and working conditions of employees."
Today's work environment is very different from that of 1900.
Public employees are protected through civil service, merit sys-
tems, and tenure. Workers in the private sector enjoy numerous
protections through collective bargaining, regulations, statutes, and
court decisions. Many changes in the law have contributed to the
creation of the current employment environment. During the last
twenty-five years, security for the worker has been encouraged by
court decisions curtailing the unrestricted right of an employer to
dismiss a worker arbitrarily. The process began slowly, but it has
gained momentum as recent decisions clearly point to the erosion
of the employment at-will doctrine. 2
This article examines the legislation and cases that have influ-
enced the erosion of the at-will doctrine. In light of the current
uncertain status of the doctrine, the author suggests alternatives to
the case-by-case, state-by-state decisions that leave both the em-
10. Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis-"A
Judge for Our Season," 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 480, 481 (1970).
11. See Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB.
L. REv. 7 (1988). Labor legislation in this country has been rooted in the premise that "indi-
vidual workers lack the bargaining power in the labor market to protect their own interests
and to obtain socially acceptable terms of employment." Id.; see also J. COMMONS & J. AN-
DREWS, PRINCIPALS OF LABOR LEGISLATION (4th rev. ed. 1936). "[lIt is one of the fundamental
disharmonies of present day industry that he [the worker] has little or no control over the
conditions which there surround him, and which profoundly affect his well-being and even
his life. Individual complaint frequently leads to loss of employment rather than to im-
provement of conditions." Id. at 159.
12. Early adherence to the doctrine of at-will employment allowed few exceptions to the
at-will rule. The exceptions which were recognized were based on specific violations of statu-
torily protected rights. One early statute which expressly limited the employer's right to
terminate was the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). This
act prohibits termination of employees duo to union activity. Id. §§ 157-58. Subsequently,
laws which created obligations for employers and rights for employees served as a basis for
exceptions to the at-will doctrine if the termination was in violation of a statutorily pro-
tected right or obligation; see, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Acts of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1982), which sets wage and hour standards; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin; Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982), which sets
safety standards in the work place. Not until the 1980's did the courts begin to recognize an
action for wrongful termination arising under other theories; see DERTOUZOA, HOLLAND, AND
EBENER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION, Rand Report
R-3602-ICJ 5 (1988). By 1985, 37 states recognized the public policy exception, 31 recog-
nized the implied contract exception, and 5 recognized the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing exception. Id. at 13.
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ployer and the employee with considerable uncertainty as to the
right to terminate an at-will employment agreement. These alter-
native approaches will provide greater balance between protecting
the right of employers to address market conditions by maintain-
ing a top quality work force and the right of employees to have
reasonable protection for their interest in employment security.
A. Statutory and Judicially Created Exceptions
The erosion of the employer's sovereignty over the work place
began with the imposition of state and federal statutes prohibiting
termination of an employee in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement.1" Approximately eighty percent of collective bargaining
agreements require just cause for dismissal. 4 Unfettered employer
discretion to terminate was also curtailed by provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1' As amended, this Act prohib-
its discrimination in employment based on race, color, sex, na-
tional origin, and religion. 6 These prohibitions restrict the com-
mon law right to terminate and require instead legitimate and
convincing business justifications for actions involving these classi-
fications of personnel.' 7 Numerous other state and federal statutes
prohibit discharges for activities such as service on a jury, garnish-
ment of wages, filing workers' compensation claims, and refusal to
submit to polygraph tests.' s Violation of these and other statutes
prompted many employees, who believed they had been wrongfully
discharged, to bring legal actions against their employers. 9 Al-
though these employees were typically employed under at-will em-
ployment contracts, which ostensibly allowed the employer to ter-
minate for any reason, a number of courts responded by creating
exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine.2"
13. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause Protection
Under Title VII," 2 IND. REL. L.J. 519, 522 (1978).
14. Peck, Unjust Discharge from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1982).
16. Id.
17. Blumrosen, supra note 13, at 519.
18. See Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 449,
456 (1985); see also Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (1988);
Jury System Improvement Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. § 1875; Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651.
19. Mallor, supra note 18, at 456.
20. Id.
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B. Public Policy Exception
The three most successful theories in creating exceptions to the
at-will doctrine are the public policy exception, the implied con-
tract exception, and the breach of good faith and fair dealing ex-
ception. These exceptions have been developed on a case-by-case
basis, and the exceptions vary widely from state to state.2'
Several courts have used public policy reasons for compensating
employees deemed to have been wrongfully discharged.2 2 The con-
cept of using public policy as a basis for overriding an at-will em-
ployment agreement poses an interesting challenge for the courts.
The term "public policy" eludes precise definition .2  The courts
that have applied the public policy exception, therefore, have at-
tempted to balance the importance of the policy to be protected
against the burden created by the limitation of managerial discre-
tion.24 In most cases, the courts have required a clear mandate that
a particular policy is necessary to protect the public interest.2 5
Under the public policy rationale, some states have recognized a
tort cause of action known as retaliatory discharge. 2 Retaliatory
discharges have been held to violate public policy under three dis-
tinct categories: (1) exercise of a statutorily granted right; (2) re-
fusal to obey employer demands to disobey the law; and (3)
whistleblowing-the reporting of illegal or dangerous practices by
employers.
21. Id.
22. E.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)
(applying public policy standard to wrongful discharge action).
23. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 71 Cal. App. 492, 497, 236 P.
210, 212 (1925). The court stated: "The question, what is public policy in a given case, is as
broad as the question of what is fraud." Id.; see also Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App.
47, 51, 264 P. 529, 530 (1928) (the court described public policy as "anything which tends to
undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or private
property, which any citizen ought to feel, is against public policy.").
24. See, e.g., Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 124, 421 N.E.2d at 876. The court stated that "it is
now recognized that a proper balance must be maintained among the employer's interest in
operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a liveli-
hood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out." Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d
at 878.
25. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1975) (stating
that an employee has no right of action for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of
public policy is violated); see also Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322, 1324
(E.D. Mo. 1975).
26. Hershizer, The New Common Law of Employment: Changes in the Concept of Em-
ployment at Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 95, 101 (1985).
27. Id.
1990]
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1. Statutory Right
A common cause of action for retaliatory discharge is based on
the termination of an at-will employee pursuant to the exercise of
a statutorily granted right, such as filing a workers' compensation
claim.28 In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,29 the injured em-
ployee filed and received a settlement under a workers' compensa-
tion claim and was subsequently discharged. In an action brought
by plaintiff against his employer for retaliatory discharge, the Indi-
ana Supreme Court held that a retaliatory discharge for filing a
workers' compensation claim was "a wrongful, unconscionable act"
that was actionable in a court of law.30 The court stated that
"under ordinary circumstances, an employee at-will may be dis-
charged without cause. However, when an employee is discharged
solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right, an exception to
the general rule must be recognized."'"
Other courts have used similar reasoning to protect rights con-
ferred on employees by statute. The Third Circuit, in deference to
a Pennsylvania law prohibiting an employer from requiring a poly-
graph test as a condition for continuation of employment, ruled
that a cause of action exists when an employee at-will is discharged
for refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. 32 In Nees v.
Hocks,3 the employee was discharged for serving on a jury over
the employer's objections. In an action in tort, the court reasoned
that not only had the plaintiff's individual statutory rights been
infringed, but the termination also violated community purpose
and societal interest.34 In each of the above cases, the courts were
willing to recognize an exception to the at-will doctrine. The excep-
tions are based on a clear policy mandate that when employees
exercise certain statutory rights or rights clearly sanctioned in pub-
lic policy, these rights must not be frustrated by the threat of loss
of employment.
28. Hershizer, supra note 26, at 101.
29. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
30. Id. at -, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
31. Id.
32. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d. Cir. 1979). The district
court dismissed the case on summary judgment, and the Third Circuit reversed and re-
manded. Id. The court reasoned that even when an issue of public policy is involved, an
employee can be discharged for legitmate reasons, "but when the fact finder can infer one
conclusion which violates public policy and one which is plausible and legitimate, invasion
of jury's province is improper." Id. at 1366.
33. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
34. Id. at -, 536 P.2d at 516.
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2. Refusal to Disobey Law
The second basis for a public policy exception involves the em-
ployee's refusal to follow unlawful directives by management. 5
Several states have recognized an action for retaliatory discharge
for employees fired for refusing to disobey the law." The first case
to recognize this exception was Petermann v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters,37 in which the employee was terminated for
refusing to lie to a government investigation committee. The court
reasoned that public interest would not be served where continua-
tion of employment was made contingent upon the commission of
an illegal act.38 The Tennessee Court of Appeals held in two sepa-
rate cases that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge would
stand where an employee is terminated for lack of willingness to
become involved in unlawful conduct mandated by the employer. 9
In Williams v. Tennessee In-Home Health Services, Inc.,40 plain-
tiff claimed that she was fired for her refusal to falsify health ser-
vices reports at the request of her employer.41 In Watson v. Cleve-
land Chair Co.,42 plaintiff truck drivers argued that they were
terminated for refusing employer demands to violate certain Inter-
state Commerce Commission ("I.C.C.") regulations and highway
speed limits. In each case, the court determined that if plaintiffs
could prove their charges, the circumstances were sufficient to cre-
ate an exception to the employment at-will rule.43
In Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,44 the Arizona
Supreme Court recognized a public policy exception to employ-
ment at-will under circumstances that did not actually violate a
statute but involved a refusal to take part in activity that was per-
sonally and morally offensive. This decision clearly expanded the
kind of management behaviors the courts may be willing to pro-
hibit. Wagenseller was a nurse at Scottsdale Memorial Hospital.
35. Hershizer, supra note 26, at 101.
36. Id.
37. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
38. Id. at -, 344 P.2d. at 27.
39. Phillips, Employment At-Will Still Alive in Tennessee, 22 TENN. B.J. 23, 24 (1986).
40. 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2351 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
41. Id. at -
42. 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2076, 2077 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
43. See 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2078; 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2353.
44. - Ariz. -, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
1990]
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She declined to take part in a skit in which the performers
"mooned" the audience.45 Her refusal apparently annoyed her su-
pervisor, who subsequently began to give her unfavorable perform-
ance evaluations and ultimately terminated her. The court, in de-
ciding to recognize the public policy exception, reasoned that
society would be better served if employers were prohibited from
discharging employees for a cause that was morally offensive.46
3. Whistleblowing
A third form of protection under the public policy exception has
been recognized for employees who report certain illegal, fraudu-
lent, or dangerous activities. A number of states recognize an em-
ployee's right of action for wrongful discharge under the
whistleblowers exception.4 These states have recognized the desir-
ability of protecting workers who are willing to speak out against
dangerous conditions and illegal activity carried on by co-workers
or employers. The Supreme Court of Kansas held for the plaintiff
in a case involving Medicaid fraud.48 The plaintiff, a probationary
medical technician at a private medical facility, reported that a
physician was billing Medicaid for laboratory work that had not
been done. After reporting this activity, the employee was fired.49
The Kansas Supreme Court held that termination under such cir-
cumstances would create an exception to the employment at-will
rule and stated that "[p]ublic policy requires that citizens in a de-
mocracy be protected from reprisals for performing their civil duty
of reporting infractions of rules, regulations, or law . . .,,"
In Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc.,51 the court held that an em-
ployee could maintain an action in tort or contract for retaliatory
discharge as a result of filing an Occupational Safety and Health
45. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1024.
46. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1033.
47. There are also several states which have enacted statutes extending general protection
to whistleblowers. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-369 (West 1981); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-51(m) (West Cum. Supp. 1989); "Whistleblowers Protection Act," ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-833 (1964); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2409 (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1989)
(prohibits discrimination and discharge of a defense contractor employee as reprisal for re-
porting significant violations of defense contracts).
48. Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 752 P.2d 685 (1988).
49. Id. at __, 752 P.2d at 686.
50. Id. at -, 752 P.2d at 689.
51. 223 N.J. Super. 435, 538 A.2d 1292 (1988).
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Act ("OSHA") complaint.52 Cerracchio, a maintenance mechanic
for Alden Leeds, was injured at work by exposure to chlorine gas.
The injury required hospitalization, and subsequently Cerracchio
exercised his rights to medical coverage under workers' compensa-
tion and reported the incident to OSHA. When he attempted to
return to work two weeks later, the plaintiff was informed that he
had been terminated.53 Cerracchio then brought an action for re-
taliatory discharge. Concerning the right of action for filing the
OSHA claim, the New Jersey court stated that the reporting of
unsafe conditions by an employee furthered strong public policy
favoring safety in the workplace.5 The court observed that retalia-
tion against the reporting employee would operate as a deterrent
to others and was contrary to the policy favoring safety. 5
5
C. Implied Contract Exception
In addition to the availability of recovery by wrongfully termi-
nated employees under the public policy exceptions to the at-will
rule, several states have recognized exceptions based on contract
theories. 6 These contract exceptions are independent of public
policy considerations. The implied contract is one contract theory
that has been used to challenge terminations of at-will employ-
ees. 5 7 An implied contract may be found in the terms of an em-
ployee handbook, policy manual, memorandum, and oral state-
ments made by the employer. Under this theory, the courts have
found that the circumstances, facts, or certain assertions by the
employer have either implied a contract for permanent employ-
ment or modified the existing at-will agreement to one of perma-
nent employment, terminable only for good cause. 8
It is well recognized in law that contracts may be implied by
circumstances, words, or conduct.59 The rationale for the implied
52. Id. at -, 538 A.2d at 1298-99.
53. Id. at -, 538 A.2d at 1295.
54. Id. at -, 538 A.2d at 1298.
55. Id.
56. Hershizer, supra note 26, at 105 n.45.
57. Id. at 104.
58. Id. at 104-06.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1986). "A promise may be stated in words
either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct." Id.; see also
CALAMARI, CONTRACTS § 1-12 (1977). "When the parties manifest their agreement by words
the contract is said to be express. When it is manifested by conduct it is said to be implied
in fact ... both are true contracts formed by a mutual manifestation of assent." Id.
1990] 195
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contract exception is based on the premise that statements or acts
indicating that an employee will be terminated only for good cause
or otherwise giving assurances of job security, create in the em-
ployee the expectation of permanent employment. Recognizing
that protection of the parties' expectations is a primary goal of
contract, courts have held that statements or acts by an employer
which promise job security create legally enforceable commitments
by employers.8 0
The leading case illustrating breach of implied contract theory is
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan.6 1 In conversa-
tions with the plaintiff prior to hiring, the defendant employer
stated that the plaintiff would be with the company "as long as he
did his job." 2 The Michigan Supreme Court found that the oral
statements made by the employer when the plaintiff was hired
were binding.8 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court determined that language in an
employee handbook could modify the at-will status of an employ-
ment agreement. 4 The plaintiff was hired under an oral at-will
agreement, but the employer subsequently issued an employment
handbook which included new employee duties and obligations and
termination procedures to be followed by the employer.6 5 The New
Mexico Supreme Court held that the handbook, which employees
were required to sign, modified the original employment agree-
ment.6 The court reasoned that the handbook did not contain any
disclaimers or other language which would alert the employee
against placing reliance on any statement.6
Do the rulings in the above cases imply that anytime an em-
ployer issues policy guidelines or makes statements concerning
company policy that these assertions will be contractually binding?
Perhaps not. Several courts have rejected the handbook exception.
The Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that the employment hand-
60. Hershizer, supra note 26, at 106.
61. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
62. Id. at -, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
63. Id. at -, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
64. Lukoski v. Sandia Indian Management Co., 106 N.M. 664, 748 P.2d 507 (1988).
65. Id. at -, 748 P.2d at 508.
66. Id. at -, 748 P.2d at 510.
67. Id. at -, 748 P.2d at 509. The court stated: "However, if an employer does choose to
issue a policy statement in a manual or otherwise . . . encourag[ing] reliance thereon, the
employer cannot be free to only selectively abide by it." Id. (quoting Leikvold v. Valley
View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 548, 688 P.2d 170, 174 (1984)).
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book was a self-imposed statement of policy and not a contract
with employees.6 With similar reasoning, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals rejected the contention that language in an employee
handbook created binding commitments for the employer suffi-
cient to transform at-will employment into a promise for lifetime
employment.69
If an employer intends to maintain an at-will employment agree-
ment and does not want to be bound by policy statements, the best
means to protect the at-will status is through clear and direct
statements or disclaimers. In Bachelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,70
the employment application signed by the plaintiff contained ex-
press language providing that the employer had the right to dis-
charge at-will. The court observed that since policy statements had
been held to bind the employer, policy statements should also
make it possible for an employer to protect itself71 Although a
number of courts have thus far refused to recognize the implied
contract exception to employment at-will, it should be noted that
twenty-five states have found that the terms of an employee hand-
book may create binding obligations for the employer, and that
number appears to be growing.7 2
Under certain circumstances, the courts may employ a promis-
sory estoppel theory to enforce oral assurances made by an em-
ployer. In Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co.,73 the plaintiff re-
jected another offer when he decided to accept the position with
Federal Life. During the negotiations prior to employment, the
employer gave oral assurances of permanent employment that the
Illinois Court of Appeals later held to be enforceable by estoppel.
The court reasoned: "We believe that when an employee gives up
another offer in exchange for and in reliance upon the employer's
promise of permanent employment, the contract, if proven, is
68. Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., - Mont. -, 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc). The handbook provided that the rules therein were subject to change at any time.
The court reasoned that, due to the general language of the handbook and the reservation of
right to modify at any time, a reasonable at-will employee would not interpret the handbook
provisions as an offer to alter the at-will employment status. Id.
69. Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. App. 1981); see also Graves v.
Anchor Wire Corp. of Tenn., 692 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App.) perm. appeal denied, (1985);
Bringle v. Methodist Hosp., 701 S.W.2d 622 (Tenn. App.) perm. appeal denied, (1985).
70. 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3467 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
71. Id. at 1484; see Mallor, supra note 18, at 458 n.45.
72. 7 Law. Alert 263 (Apr. 4, 1988).
73. 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982).
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enforceable. ' 4
D. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception
Another contract-based doctrine which has been successfully
used by some plaintiffs in employment cases, is the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. Several states have held that
the parties to a contract have an implied duty to exercise good
faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts. Failure to
exercise good faith constitutes bad faith, and such conduct may
give rise to the application of tort remedies. Traditionally the cove-
nant of good faith has not been imposed to address arbitrary con-
duct by contracting parties. The covenant required instead that
neither party do anything to interfere with the other's performance
of its contractual obligations or the other's right to receive benefits
under the contract.75 Many of the jurisdictions that recognize the
good faith exception to employment at-will base the requirement
of good faith on the long standing concept that at common law
there "exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" in
every contract.76
Perhaps the most influential case to use the theory was Cleary v.
American Airlines.77 Cleary had been employed by American Air-
lines for eighteen years when he was fired. The company alleged
that the reason for dismissal was theft, but Cleary claimed that his
firing was due to his union activities. 7 Although this case could
have been decided on public policy determinations, the California
Court of Appeals held instead that the discharge was wrongful in
that it violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
that is present in every contract, including at-will employment.79
The court concluded that when employers act to deprive employ-
ees of the benefits of employment without just cause, this demon-
strates a lack of good faith and thus constitutes a breach of the
covenant.8 ° The court based its finding of a covenant primarily on
two factors, long term employment and the existence of an internal
74. Id. at 602-03, 440 N.E.2d at 1004.
75. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, -, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980).
76. See generally 1 WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 670 (3d ed. 1957).
77. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
78. Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at -.
79. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at -.
80. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at -.
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grievance procedure.81 Subsequent cases in California and else-
where have varied the factors required to find the existence of a
covenant. Although the existence of a covenant is founded in con-
tract, the Cleary decision entitled the employee to tort damages,
including damages for emotional distress and punitive damages,
thus creating a hybrid theory containing elements of both contract
and tort. However, the availability of punitive damages for wrong-
ful termination cases based on bad faith dismissals was subse-
quently denied by the California Supreme Court.2 The court rea-
soned that because the action was based on contract, recovery
should be limited to contract damages.8
In another leading case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts recognized the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
at-will employment. In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,84
the plaintiff, a twenty-five year employee, was fired shortly after
closing a five million dollar order. The jury found that the em-
ployer had exercised bad faith in terminating the employee in an
effort to deprive him of the full commission due from the sale. 5
The New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized the good faith
exception in Monge v. Beeke Rubber Co.86 In this case, the em-
ployee was harassed, demoted, and ultimately fired after she re-
fused to accept a date with her foreman. The court held that the
termination constituted a retaliatory act motivated by bad faith. 7
The court reasoned that the interest of neither the employee nor
the public is well served when employers are able to make employ-
ment contingent upon bad faith manipulation by the employer.8 8 It
is important to note, however, that subsequent New Hampshire
cases have restricted the holding of Monge to requiring both bad
faith and a violation of public policy for wrongful discharge.8"
81. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at _.
82. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1989).
83. Id. at -, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
84. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
85. Id. at -, 364 N.E.2d at 1258.
86. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
87. Id. at -, 316 A.2d at 551. The court noted that "a termination by an employer of a
contract of employment at-will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retali-
ation is not the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a
breach of the employment contract." Id. at -, 316 A.2d at 551. (quoting Frampton v. Cen-
tral Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)).
88. Id. at -, 316 A.2d at 551.
89. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140
(1981).
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In a recent Montana case, Stark v. Circle K Corp.,90 the supreme
court upheld a sizable award for the plaintiff based on breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.91 The court relied on a
1982 decision in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.,92 which
held that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts may be "implied as a matter of law based on public pol-
icy."' s The court further noted that good faith is not subject to
contractual waiver, express or implied.9 4 Thus, it is clear that while
a disclaimer may be sufficient to prevent the terms of an employ-
ment manual or handbook from creating a binding contract, a dis-
claimer or other language will not relieve the employer of the duty
to exercise good faith in the employment relationship.
III. NEED FOR EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
There are unquestionably terminations that involve outrageous
conduct by an employer or circumstances underlying a discharge
that are so egregious that the legal system cannot and should not
condone the discharge of the wronged employee. Traditionally,
there has been considerable disparity between the bargaining posi-
tions of the employer and employee, with the employer enjoying
the upper hand.9" The employer has generally been able to pick
and choose not only who will be hired, but also virtually all of the
terms of employment as well. Even the balance between the mu-
tual right of the employer and employee to terminate is tipped in
favor of the employer because "in the real world of industrial rela-
tions, employees seldom quit voluntarily.""8 The effects of a sud-
90. 230 Mont. 468, 751 P.2d 162 (1988).
91. Id. at -, 751 P.2d at 169. Plaintiff was awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages
and $70,000 in punitive damages. The punitive damages were justified on the basis that
defendant had demonstrated a "lack of candor" during the trial. Id. at -, 751 P.2d at 169.
92. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1963 (1982).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Feinman, The Development of the Employment At-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118 (1976) for a discussion of the social and economic climate which nurtured the at
will rule.
Employment at-will is the ultimate guarantor of the capitalist's authority over the
worker. The rule transformed long-term and semi-permanent relationships into non-
binding agreements terminable at-will. If employees could be dismissed on a mo-
ment's notice, obviously they could not claim a voice in the determination of the
conditions of work or the use of the product of their labor.
Id. at 132-33.
96. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full
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den termination would usually, though not always, work a far
greater hardship on an employee when involuntarily terminated
than on the employer when the employee voluntarily resigns.
The United States is the only major Western industrialized na-
tion not requiring statutory protections against arbitrary dismis-
sals.9 7 The United States worker, like those in other civilized na-
tions, has a strong interest in employment security and should
reasonably be able to expect continued employment where the
worker does the job expected within reasonable legal, moral, and
ethical limits. Society is better served when job security for
America's work force is not linked to unreasonable employer ex-
pectations. The current system of redress for wrongful termination
works against all parties and especially to the disadvantage of low
income employees. One commentator observes that "[f]or the vast
majority of nonunion employees, a court suit is still not an effec-
tive or readily available avenue for relief [since] [t]he court system
is too cumbersome, expensive, and time consuming for most
cases.
e98
The effects of termination encompass far more than economic
hardship for the terminated employee. Both psychological and eco-
nomic effects on individuals who lose their jobs can be easily docu-
mented. The strain on the individual may also have far reaching
effects for society in that numerous health problems, increased sui-
cides, mental breakdowns, and family discord all have been associ-
ated with loss of employment.100 These repercussions may be una-
voidable under certain circumstances when an employee is released
for good cause, but individual and social costs are so high that the
legal system can no longer afford to protect or countenance arbi-
trary or bad faith dismissals.
Flower, 67 NEB. L. REv. 56, 67-68 (1988).
97. Id. at 68.
98. Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiff's Perspective,
67 NEB. L. REV. 178, 190 (1988).
99. Id. at 181. Tobias observed:
After World War II ... [t]he job became the prime source of identity for millions of
Americans. For many, career and workplace was the focus of their lives. 'Discharge'
was labeled as the capital punishment of the industrial world. The average American
has less than three months pay in savings. The loss of income causes severe economic
hardship .... The discharged employee suffers intense emotional distress. He has
been labeled a failure. His self-esteem, which is wrapped up in his job is gone.
Id.; see also Comment, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1444-45 (1975) [hereinafter A Common Law Action].
100. See Tobias, supra note 98, at 181-82.
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IV. NEED TO PROTECT EMPLOYER RIGHTS
Most literature discussing employment rights strongly advocates
the rights of workers and admonishes employers for abuses." 1
However, abuses have occurred in both directions. Employees can
take advantage of employers or quit their jobs, leaving employers
with little or no notice. Where employees hold key positions in a
company, a sudden and unexpected departure may cause consider-
able hardship on the employer. These cases, however, seldom end
up in court. The reality for the employer is that there is little or
nothing to be gained from taking action against an employee, and
there is a considerable amount to lose in terms of employee mo-
rale, company image, and public relations.
In spite of the duality of employment abuses, very little print is
dedicated to the need for protecting employers and their rights. 102
It has been argued that power itself protects employers. 03 How-
ever, as the power of the employer is whittled away by numerous
statutory protections for workers, judicially imposed exceptions to
at-will employment, and endless regulatory requirements covering
the gamut of employment practices, it cannot be seriously argued
that the employer today is all powerful. Given the current legal
environment, the employer's ability to make sound economic deci-
sions is impaired by fear of inviting litigation. As courts demon-
strate greater willingness to find for the plaintiff and impose con-
tract and tort damages, the employer is forced to weigh every
termination decision against potential exposure to litigation. Even
in wrongful discharge cases in which the employer prevails, the de-
fense fees and expenses are typically in the $50,000 to $100,000
range.10 4 There are also significant costs incurred in implementing
policies to avoid litigation, including administrative costs for docu-
mentation, record keeping, evaluation procedures, and loss of man-
agerial discretion.
101. See, e.g., Gradwohl, The Search For Policies on Protecting the Opportunity of an
Individual to Earn a Livelihood Through Performance of Personal Services, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 1 (1988); Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty
to Terminate in Good Faith, 93 HARY. L. REV. 1816 (1980); A Common Law Action, supra
note 99.
102. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At-Will, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 947 (1984); Lar-
son, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption that Employment is Terminable At-
Will, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 219 (1986-87).
103. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1989).
104. Dertouzoa, Holland, and Ebener, The Legal and Economic Consequences of Wrong-
ful Termination, Rand Report R-3602-ICJ, at 37 (1988).
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Where the employee prevails in a wrongful discharge suit, the
employer may be exposed to virtually unlimited damage awards.
There appears to be a growing willingness on the part of the courts
to award injured plaintiffs both contract damages as well as puni-
tive damages and damages for emotional distress. Tort remedies
added to the traditional contract remedies have accounted for
awards of up to eight million dollars.105 These large awards are
causing a knee jerk reaction in a number of jurisdictions. Recogniz-
ing the potential overexposure of employers, the California Su-
preme Court recently attempted to cap the huge damages awarded
to wrongfully terminated employees. Although California has tra-
ditionally been a stronghold for worker protection, in Foley v. In-
teractive Data Corp., the court limited damages to lost pay and
related economic damages. 06 Foley, a branch manager with six
years of work experience with Chase Manhattan Bank's Interactive
Data Corp., claimed that he had consistently received praise, sal-
ary increases, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evalua-
tions during his employment. 0 7 These positive actions by manage-
ment led Foley to believe that his performance was satisfactory
and his job secure, but he was fired after reporting to his employer
that a new supervisor was under FBI investigation for allegedly
embezzling funds from a former employer. 0 8 The court found that
Foley had been wrongfully terminated but stated that the employ-
ment relationship was "fundamentally contractual" and therefore,
recovery should be limited to contract damages. 0 9 The court rea-
soned that limiting damages to contract remedies would promote
stability in the business community by establishing parameters for
damage awards and eliminating the uncertainty inherent in expo-
sure to tort damages." 0
The Foley holding illustrates that while workers need protection,
employers, too, must be protected. It is widely recognized that
American productivity, job pride, and worker loyalty are becoming
endangered."' As society shifts from a manufacturing to a service
105. Id. at 26.
106. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, -, 765 P.2d 373, 401, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, - (1989).
107. Id. at -, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at -.
108. Id.
109. Id. at -, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at -.
110. Id.
111. See L. IACOCCA, IACOCCA 321 (1984) (comparing an American worker's attitude of that
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society and from a society that demands many unskilled laborers
to one that requires highly skilled and educated specialists, the
pendulum of power will inevitably shift in favor of the employee.
As workers become better educated and more specialized, competi-
tion for specialized skills will create an employment market that
will be much more favorable to the employee. The early part of the
century saw the rise of labor unions and collective bargaining as
the means of protecting worker interests. During the second half of
the century, there has been a decline in the size and influence of
labor unions as only about twenty-five percent of private employ-
ment is protected by collective bargaining.112 Today workers enjoy
considerably more regulatory and judicially imposed protections.
The next century will inevitably witness another shift. As court
dockets become more backlogged and the cost of litigation becomes
more prohibitive, American society must find a better means for
striking a balance between the needs of the employee and those of
the employer.
V. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The once impenetrable fortress of at-will employment is no
longer a reality. The demise itself may not be bad, but one must
question whether the current method of change is the best ap-
proach. The time is right to abandon the concept of at-will em-
ployment and institute instead a policy which permits dismissal
only for good cause. As one assesses the growing number of cases
brought and won by terminated employees and the increasing will-
ingness of courts to override the right of the employer to terminate
at-will, there is a legitimate argument that in many states there is
now a de facto good cause requirement, in spite of continued lip
service to the concept of employment at-will. The requirement of
good cause termination would not, however, entirely eliminate the
problem. Termination for good cause means a "fair and honest
cause or reason regulated by good faith on the part of the party
exercising the power." 1 3 There will always be legitimate disputes
as to what constitutes good cause, and there will continue to be
claims, some well founded, some not, that the stated cause for ter-
of a Japanese worker: "Whereas the attitude of the Japanese worker is, 'How can I help?,'
the attitude of his American counterpart is, all too often, 'That's not my job' "). For a dis-
cussion of worker attitudes, see generally, S. TERKEL, WORKING (1974).
112. Summers, supra note 11, at 10.
113. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, -, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981).
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mination is simply a pretext and that the real reason for dismissal
would not satisfy the requirement of good cause. The economic cir-
cumstances of the employer must be incorporated within the defi-
nition of good cause. While cuts in the work force for economic
reasons unquestionably work hardship on terminated employees,
employers cannot lose the flexibility to make adjustments where
the long term viability of the company is at risk. Lack of such
management discretion places all workers at risk.
A good cause requirement would lend more certainty to the em-
ployment arrangement for both the employer and employee. It
would eliminate or reduce the necessity for implied contract excep-
tions and automatically incorporate the requirement of good faith
and fair dealing within the meaning of good cause. This arrange-
ment would not necessarily require a term of employment, and
there would be no need for a one year implied term. The presump-
tion would be that employment duration was indefinite but could
be terminated for good cause. Summers argues that:
Limitation of the employment at-will doctrine requires only fairness;
it does not require keeping unproductive employees. Indeed, fairness
and job security may improve employee morale, and with it, increase
productivity. At the very least, requiring fair procedures and good
cause may prevent hasty, ill-considered, and unnecessary loss of po-
tentially valuable employees in whose training the employer has a
substantial investment. 114
New employees should undergo a probationary period of six
months to a year, during which time the employment relationship
could be terminated even without the good cause requirement. The
rationale behind this policy is that an employer could terminate an
employee if it appeared that for whatever reason the employee
would not be satisfactory. Allowing the employer to terminate with
greater latitude in the early stages of employment makes sense in
that the employer is not likely to terminate the employee arbitrar-
ily or the employee would not have been hired in the first place.
Secondly, the employee does not have a large investment in terms
of time and benefits in a particular job during the first year. The
probationary period gives both the employer and employee an op-
portunity to assess one another to determine if the relationship is
right for long-term employment relationship. Terminations during
114. Summers, supra note 11, at 17.
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the probationary period for reasons violating public policy would
be subject to redress. If the employment relationship is continued
beyond the probationary period, a good cause standard would be in
effect.
The question of how to deal with disputes must also be ad-
dressed. Martin proposes an administrative system of dispute reso-
lution for wrongful termination claims." 5 This system would pro-
vide for disputes to be decided by arbitration rather than
litigation. Martin argues that both employers and employees would
be better served in that the system would provide for limited dam-
ages but speedy dispute resolution."' Under this system, the rem-
edy for wrongful termination would be limited to back pay with no
reinstatement and no compensation for emotional distress."'
Many of these suggestions have been incorporated in the Mon-
tana wrongful discharge statute." 8 Montana is the only state thus
far that has adopted a wrongful discharge statute. The statute en-
courages voluntary arbitration, 19 but it does not prohibit an ag-
grieved employee from litigating. The statute has served as a
model for at least a dozen other states considering similar stat-
utes.120 There is also a pronounced movement toward the develop-
ment of a model law containing provisions similar to the Montana
statute.'2 '
The Montana statute, while broadly prohibiting termination
without good cause, outlines three basic causes'of action for wrong-
ful termination. These causes of action include: (1) an action for
retaliatory discharge for employee refusal to violate public policy
or reporting of violations of public policy;'22 (2) action by non-pro-
bationary employees where discharge has not been for good
cause;' and (3) an action for employees discharged in violation of
express provisions of written personnel policies. 24 The statute lim-
115. Note, Employment At-Will: Just Cause Protection Through Mandatory Arbitra-
tion, 62 WASH. L. REv. 151, 163 (1987).
116. Id. at 170.
117. Id. at 163.
118. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1987).
119. See id. § 39-2-914.
120. Barrett, Wrongful-Dismissal Laws May Feel Effect of Dispute Before Montana's
High Court, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1988, at BI, col. 3.
121. St. Antoine, supra note 96, at 58.
122. MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-2-904(1) (1987).
123. Id. § 32-2-904(2).
124. Id. § 32-2-904(3).
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its available remedies to lost wages and benefits, plus interest, for a
period not to exceed four-years from date of discharge.'25 The stat-
ute also limits punitive damages to circumstances involving termi-
nations in violation of public policy incorporating fraud or actual
malice on the part of the employer.'26 Additionally, the statute im-
poses on the terminated employee the duty to mitigate damages' 27
and does not provide for reinstatement of the terminated
employee.'2 8
The section of the statute dealing with damages has been chal-
lenged under the claim that it unconstitutionally limits the right to
full legal redress.' 29 Earlier this year, a trial court ruled that the
restriction of awards violates the Montana Constitution's guaran-
tee of "full legal redress for injury.' 130 However, the Montana Su-
preme Court recently ruled that the limitation on remedies neither
violates individual rights to full legal redress nor equal protec-
tion. 13 ' The opinion upholding the Montana statute is expected to
generate numerous attempts by other state legislatures to cap
awards. 132 St. Antoine, one of the chief drafters of the model law,
asserts that the Montana law provides a trade-off between basic
protection to workers and reasonable limits on awards.'33
There would be considerable benefit to having a model law or
uniform statute adopted by all states. Adoption on a state-by-state
basis would allow for minor variations for local preferences and
some degree of experimentation, but it would give broad protection
to workers, eliminate state-by-state ad hoc decisions, and help pro-
mote fairness and rights of due process in the workplace. While
employers may groan at the thought of one more area of regulation
governing the workplace, a survey of recent cases for wrongful ter-
mination and appraisal of some recent damage awards may give
cause to rethink this issue. In a recent article, Whitehall describes
some of the damages that may be sought in employment cases. T3
125. Id. § 32-2-905(1).
126. Id. § 32-2-905(2).
127. Id. § 32-2-905(1).
128. See supra note 117.
129. E.g., Johnson v. State, - Mont. -, 776 P.2d 1221 (1989); Meech v. Hillhaven W.,
Inc., -, - Mont. __, 776 P.2d 488 (1989).
130. Barrett, supra note 120, at BI, col. 3.
131. Meech, - Mont. at -, 776 P.2d at 488.
132. See Barrett, supra note 120, at col. 5.
133. Id.
134. Whitehill, Damages in Employment Contract Cases, 24 TRIAL 25 (July 1988).
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These include lost wages (including salary, bonuses, lost profits
and commissions), lost benefits (including medical, life, and disa-
bility insurance, pension benefits, lost experience and reputation,
personal use of company car, and employee discounts), reliance
damages, and compensatory damages.135 Litigation for wrongful
terminations amounts to millions of dollars in damages and attor-
neys' fees annually without affording broad protection to all work-
ers. Summers argues that "[m]ost workers do not have the price of
admission to the legal system. They cannot afford a lawyer, and
most claims are too small to produce a viable contingent fee."'' 3
In addition to the numerous types of damage awards tradition-
ally available in contract actions, there is an increasing willingness
by courts to award punitive damages in cases involving wrongful
discharge. 13 7 Most wrongful discharge cases involving punitive
damages come under the public policy exception brought in tort
actions. However, courts have shown increasing willingness to su-
persede traditional prohibitions against awarding punitive dam-
ages in contract actions where "a serious wrong, tortious in nature,
has been committed . 1. 3"183 This language was used by the Indi-
ana Supreme Court in an insurance case reasoning that "the public
interest will be served by the deterrent effect punitive damages
will have upon future conduct. . . ."I" There is little reason to
doubt that, given the right set of facts, courts will use a similar
rationale to award punitive damages in employment contract cases.
The courts have already awarded punitive damages in cases involv-
ing breach of implied covenants of good faith, as in Stark, dis-
cussed above.140
Mallor argues that there is some justification for punitive dam-
ages in wrongful discharge cases as a means of correcting "the im-
balance of power which results from the practical inability of unor-
ganized employees to bargain individually for job security" and to
deter "abuse of power in the employment context.' 4' While the
threat of punitive damages specifically and court actions in general
do have a deterrent effect on wrongful discharges, they may also
135. Id.
136. Summers, supra note 11, at 25.
137. See generally Mallor, supra note 18.
138. Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, -, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976).
139. Id. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180.
140. Stark v. Circle K. Corp., - Mont .... 751 P.2d 162, 169 (1988).
141. Mallor, supra note 18, at 489.
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have a chilling effect on business decision making. The current sys-
tem of court imposed exceptions to employment at-will, with an
ever increasing risk of new and different exceptions combined with
ever enlarging damage awards, gives employers little certainty in
advance as to whether a particular termination decision will be
deemed lawful. Under a uniform statute, damages would be limited
to actual economic injury for a limited period. Punitive damages
would not be allowed or would be limited to extremely egregious
circumstances.
A new standard, which would require good cause to terminate
and dispute resolution by arbitration, would afford a number of
advantages-greater certainty for both parties, greater consistency
in awards, increased judicial economy via the removal of numerous
cases from the already overburdened court system, and rapid re-
covery for wrongfully terminated employees at a fraction of the
cost of litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Litigation of employee rights has become big business in the
1980's. Case law illustrates numerous examples of abuse. Good
conscience dictates that the legal system must not support, if only
by inaction, circumstances where employment is contingent upon
carrying on illegal activities, succumbing to improper advances by
an employer, or foregoing rights that were statutorily instituted to
protect workers.
Wrongful termination cases have monumental monetary and so-
cial costs. The reality of the current employment environment is
that an employer no longer has an unfettered right to fire employ-
ees, and if an employee is fired, the employer must be able to
show, if not good cause, at least the absence of bad cause.
Neither party to an employment contract is well served by the cur-
rent system. The courts are finding implied contracts where no
contract was intended, the express right of employers to terminate
at-will is riddled with exceptions, and the reality for employees
who want and need redress for wrongful termination is that redress
via the court system may take years and the cost may be prohibi-
tive. The interests of both parties must be balanced and a new sys-
tem for addressing disputes must be developed if America is to re-
main competitive in the world market during the next century.
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